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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Appellate Division of the New 
York Supreme Court has held that the 
right to privacy protects "confidential 
communications" from a child to his 
parents. 1 In so holding, the court 
expressed concern over the policy 
implications of allowing the state to 
"compel parents to disclose information 
given to them in context of [a familial] 
confidential setting."2 Although the 
court based its holding on constitutional 
grounds, it effectively adopted a 
testimonial privilege3 unique in this 
country's jurisprudence.4 Whether this 
so-called "parent-child privilege" will 
gain general acceptance in other 
jurisdictions or is merely an aberration 
found primarily in the New York courts5 
is not yet clear.6 
This article examines the historical 
bases and the relevant policy arguments 
which underlie testimonial privileges in 
general, and those which relate to the 
parent-child privilege in particular. 
Special attention is devoted to recent 
case law on the subject. Lastly, the 
author proposes a model statute which 
would extend a limited chitd-parent7 
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testimonial privilege to a narrowly 
defined class of claimants. 
II. TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES IN 
GENERAL 
One commentator has recently 
classified privileges into "three distinct 
types," including those designed to 
protect individuals against unlawful 
government intrusions (as in the case of 
compelled self-incrimination) and those 
which "protect the maintenance of our 
Government" (as provided by the 
protection from unlawful disclosure 
which is afforded government secrets). 8 
This article, however, is concerned with 
the third "type" of privilege; that is, 
privileges "designed to be a 'significant 
expression of the law's concern or 
regard for the security of the individual 
as a participant in relationships which the 
state considers it important to foster and 
protect and ... for the security and 
sanctity of the relationship itself. "'9 
In recent decades, testimonial 
privileges of this latter type have 
proliferated in number far beyond those 
found at common law. 10 The earliest 
common law privileges addressed the 
values and concerns of society and law 
makers in a somewhat imprecise 
manner. Dean Wigmore observed, for 
example, that a "gentlemen's honor" 
and "one's pledge of privacy" were 
reason enough at one time to claim 
privilege from giving testimony. 11 Thus, 
while the goal of these privileges may 
have focused on the interest of the 
communicating parties in maintaining 
the integrity of the communication to 
the extent that it was private, the 
privilege was so ill-defined as to be 
unworkable. 12 
The English courts soon came to 
recognize that privileges against 
compelled testimony presented 
obstacles to the essential truth gathering 
function of the court. As a result, the 
firm rule was established that "[N]o 
pledge of privacy nor oath of secrecy can 
avail against a demand for the truth in a 
court of justice." 13 It was reasoned that 
society has a "right" to evidence which 
enhances the quest for truth, and that 
the right to that truth is vindicated by 
the imposition of a "duty" upon each 
member of society to tell what he 
knows. 14 Consequently, the maxim that 
"[ t ]he public ... has a right to every 
man's evidence"15 prevailed. 
Like the privileges found at common 
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law, modern testimonial privileges have 
devolved more from societal concerns 
than from any strictly legal theory. In 
contrast to the common law, however, it 
is no longer axiomatic that "[ w ]hen the 
course of justice requires the 
investigation of the truth, no man has 
any knowledge that is rightly private." 16 
Modern society requires effective 
interaction among its members if it is to 
function successfully. If one accepts that 
effective interaction between 
communicants is enhanced by openness 
and the absence of fear of unwanted 
disclosure,17 certain relationships are 
indeed "rightly private." Because society 
benefits from certain confidential (and 
"rightly private") interaction, 
testimonial privileges are employed to 
foster particular relationships on the 
theory that the benefits to society 
outweigh the cost exacted by their 
operation. 
Current testimonial privileges act to 
prevent disclosure of confidential 
communications between individuals 
within the context of the protected 
relationship. Where a valid basis for a 
privilege is presented, it falls to the 
opponent of the privilege to 
demonstrate that the privilege does not 
apply.18 But, because they hamper the 
"truth-seeking function of legal 
proceedings," 19 testimonial privileges 
are construed strictly by the courts when 
their operation is asserted.2° 
It is clearly established that only "the 
person vested with the outside interest 
or relationship fostered by the particular 
privilege" may claim its benefits to the 
extent that the privilege acts to preserve 
confidences. 21 In the case of 
"professional privileges" (i.e., those 
privileges other than the husband-wife 
privilege)22, the privilege may be 
asserted only by its "owner. "23 
Circumstances which tend to indicate 
that a legitimate expectation of 
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confidentiality is held by a 
communicant otherwise entitled to 
claim a privilege, thus entitles him to 
assert the claim. 24 
With the exceptions of the husband-
wife25 and the attorney-client 26 
privileges which appeared at common 
law,27 present testimonial privileges 
generally are statutory in origin; and, 
excepting the husband-wife privilege, all 
are designed to encompass the personal 
associations entered into by 
professionals in the conduct of an 
avocation. Although some states 
recognize privileges not recognized by 
others, many states have extended 
recognition to the physician-patient,28 
cleric-penitent,29 psychotherapist-
patient,30 accountant-client,31 social 
worker-client,32 and newsperson33 
privileges. 
The generally acknowledged test for 
validation of testimonial privileges 
consists of four criteria proposed by 
Dean Wigmore. 34 He argued that a 
communication is entitled to 
recognition and affirmative sanction 
only when the following are evident: 
(1) The communications must 
originate in a confidence that they 
will not be disclosed. 
(2) The element of confidentiality 
must be essential to the full and 
satisfactory maintenance of the 
relation between the parties. 
(3) The relation must be one which 
in the opinion of the community 
ought to be sedulously fostered. 
( 4) The injury that would inure to 
the relation by the disclosure of 
the communications must be 
greater than the benefit thereby 
gained for the correct disposal 
litigation.35 
Wigmore himself pointed out that 
two of the generally recognized 
privileges did not meet all four criteria. 
He asserted that recognition of the 
doctor-patient privilege, in particular, 
rests on the fallacious assumption that 
the second and fourth conditions are 
"generally present. "36 
Of greater difficulty to Wigmore was 
the husband-wife privilege. The 
principal argument against that privilege 
is that the fourth condition is not met 
insofar as "the occasional compulsory 
disclosure in court of even the most 
intimate marital communicatons [will] 
not in fact affect to any perceptible 
degree the extent to which spouses share 
confidences."37 Nevertheless, Wigmore 
asserted that "since the other three 
conditions are so fully satisfied and since 
the compulsory disclosure of marital 
secrets at least might cast a cloud upon an 
essential aspect of the institution of 
marriage, the present privilege should be 
recognized. "38 
If shared confidences are indeed 
among the "essential aspect[ s J" of the 
marital relationship, and if the 
relationship between parents and their 
children flows directly from and adheres 
to the marital relationship, it is proper to 
inquire whether the same "aspects" 
appear in the parent-child relationship 
itself. If it is determined that they do 
appear, there can be little doubt that the 
underlying rationale for a testimonial 
privilege involving confidential 
communications between children and 
their parents is established, at least to the 
extent that such rationale is in 
conformity with Wigmore's "essential 
aspect" rationale supra. 39 
Christopher N. Luhn is a recent 
graduate of the University of Baltimore 
School of Law. 
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III. THE "PARENT .CHILD 
PRIVILEGE" AND THE COURTS 
A. The New York Cases 
As indicated at the beginning of this 
article,40 the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of New York has had 
occasion to consider the question of the 
so-called 'parent-child privilege.'41 In 
Application of A & M the court reached 
its landmark decision on the basis of the 
constitutional right to privacy42 and on 
public policy considerations involving 
the desirability of curtailing the 
intrusive power of the state. 43 In a 
stirring colloquy the court declared: 
If we accept the proposition 
that the fostering of a 
confidential parent-child 
relationship is necessary to 
the child's development of a 
positive system of values, 
and results in an ultimate 
good to society as a whole, 
there can be no doubt what 
the effect on that relation-
ship would be if the State 
could compel parents to 
disclose information given 
compel their testimony before a grand 
jury regarding the alleged admissions. 46 
The subpoena was quashed on motion 
by the parents, apparently on two 
grounds: (1) that the marital privilege 
encompassed a parent-child privilege;47 
and, (2) that a constitutional right of 
privacy extended to confidential intra-
family communications.48 On appeal 
from the order to quash the subpoena, 
the New York Appellate Division, 
Fourth Department, reversed the Trial 
Term on other grounds49 but held, inter 
alia, that the rights of privacy protected 
the confidential communications made 
by a minor child to his parents "under 
some circumstance. "SO 
In A & M the court was not 
confronted with the issue of 
"ownership" of the privilege asserted. 51 
In remanding the case the court confined 
its directions to the factual context 
involved, applying a balancing test 
between the 'legitimate [state] interest in 
the process of fact-finding necessary to 
discover, try and punish criminal 
behavior"52 and the legitimate 
expectation of privacy vested in the 
Surely the thought of the state forcing 
a mother and father to reveal their child's 
alleged misdeeds is shocking to our 
sense of decency, fairness and propriety. 
to them in the context of that 
confidential setting. Surely 
the thought of the State 
forcing a mother and father 
to reveal their child's alleged 
misdeeds, as confesed to 
them in private, to provide 
the basis for criminal charges 
is shocking to our sense of 
decency, fairness and 
propriety. It is inconsistent 
with the way of life we 
cherish and guard so 
carefull y and raises the 
specter of a regime which 
encourages betrayal of one's 
offspring.44 
In A & M a sixteen-year-old youth 
was believed by prosecutors to have 
made voluntary admissions to his 
parents within the privacy of their home 
regarding an arson fire at a nearby 
college campus. 45 Acting on reports by 
witnesses that the boy was seen in the 
area of the fire, a local district attorney 
sought to subpoena the boy's parents to 
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youth and his family.53 The court noted 
that it may be necessary for a trial court 
to conduct additional evidentiary 
hearings54 and it set forth three criteria 
which must be met before a 
communication from the child to his 
parents is entitled to the privilege. 55 The 
communication must have been (1) 
made by the minor 56 child,57 (2) "in the 
context of the familial setting,"58 and, 
(3) within the context of an appeal for 
"support, advice or guidance ... ."59 If 
these criteria were met the court 
concluded, "the interest of society in 
protecting and nuturing the parent-child 
relationship is of such overwhelming' 
significance that the State's interest in 
fact-finding must give way."60 Thus, 
despite an express acknowledgement by 
the court that the adoption of new 
privileges is an exclusively legislative 
function,61 the court in A & M 
effectively "created" a new testimonial 
privilege. 62 
It is unfortunate that the A & M court 
did not address the issue of privilege in a 
more direct manner. While there can be 
little doubt that the court intended that 
the foregoing criteria apply beyond the 
context of the case before it, the court 
failed to adequately define the 
parameters of the privilege it had 
created. Instead, in a later footnote the 
court indicated that its "discussion 
encompasse[ d] cases only in which all 
family members seek to preserve the 
confidentiality of the communications. "63 
This vague caveat was surely intended to 
narrow, not broaden, the scope of 
inquiry; however, if such was the court's 
intent, it accomplished the opposite 
result by its failure to anticipate and 
resolve such issues as whether the 
privilege may be maintained when the 
communication occurs in the presence 
of siblings or other "family members," 
whether those who join in asserting the 
privilege are required to be present at the 
time the communication is made,64 and, 
whether the assertion of the privilege 
may be defeated when one of the parents 
to whom the confidential communica-
tion is made wishes to disclose the 
communication in the honest belief that 
disclosure is in the best long-term 
interest of the child. 65 It would appear, 
then, that despite the otherwise 
adequate limitations of the three criteria 
set forth by the court,66 its failure to 
define the scope of its holding 
encouraged disparate application of the 
holding by other courts. 
Diverse application of the A & M 
holding was clearly evident when, less 
than two years after that decision, a 
Westchester County (New York) court 
had occasion to consider the issue of the 
parent-child privilege in People v. 
Fitzgerald. 67 The two cases were similar 
in that both involved allegedly 
confidential communications from a 
child to his parent(s), and involved 
communications made for the apparent 
purpose of obtaining support, advice 
and guidance from the parente s). The 
principal factual distinction between the 
two cases was the ages of the children 
involved. 
In Fitzgerald, the father of a twenty 
three-year old man sought to suppress 
the testimony given by the father before 
a grand jury which was investigating the 
hit-and-run killing of a teenage gir1.68 
The son had discussed the matter with 
his father two days after the accident and 
the father had subsequently testified 
under subpoena before a grand jury as to 
the details of the conversation. 69 On a 
motion by the defendant's father to 
preclude the substance of his testimony 
before the grand jury which related to 
the conversation with his son, the court 
found that "[a 'parent-child' privilege] 
can and does exist, grounded in law, 
logic, morality and ethics"70 and that the 
conversation involved a "confidential 
communication" between the defendant 
and his father. 7l The court then ruled 
that the State was precluded "from 
compelling disclosure from the father 
on such matters."72 
The Fitzgerald court believed it was 
confronted with "a classic example for 
the application of a parent-child 
privilege"73 and held that the privilege 
applied regardless of the age of the 
child. 74 The court noted the three 
criteria set forth by the A & M court, but 
rejected the limitations sought by the 
State as to age, declaring "[ t ]he mutual 
trust and understanding ... between the 
parent and the child cannot be made 
subject to the intrusion of the State 
merely because of a proposed artificial 
barrier of age. "75 
In rejecting age as a factor for 
application of a parent-child privilege, 
the Fitzgerald court analogized the 
privilege to the husband-wife privilege. 76 
The court noted that the husband-wife 
privilege is mutual in that "[b ]oth 
parties ... must consent to divulgence of 
confidential communications between 
them. "77 The court reasoned that the 
interests which underlie the marital 
privilege also adhere to the entire 
familial setting insofar as "the family 
relationship forms a common bond 
wherein the interests of the parties are 
similar .... "78 Thus, the court held, inter 
alia, where the confidential 
communications79 occur between a 
parent and a child within the context of 
the familial setting, and are "intended by 
both parties for the purpose of obtaining 
support, advice and guidance, "80 the 
communications themselves are 
privileged and their disclosure may not 
be compelled when either party asserts 
the privilege.8l 
The holdings of the A & M and 
Fitzgerald courts are similar as they relate 
to the viability of a parent-child 
testimonial privilege; however, as 
applied, the factual context- of the two 
cases and the manner in which the courts 
resolved the issues before them renders 
the decisions wholly incompatible. A & 
M involved an unemancipated minor 
child82 who apparently was not under 
indictment,83 but was merely a possible 
target of a grand jury investigation into a 
crime.84 In Fitzgerald, the communicant 
was emancipated, an adult, and was a 
defendant in a criminal action. 8s 
Further, in A & M the parents of the 
child sought to invoke the privilege for 
the purpose of avoiding altogether a 
subpoena to appear before a grand 
jury.86 Fitzgerald involved a motion to 
suppress testimony voluntarily given 
before a grand jury by the parent of an 
adult defendant.87 Although it was not a 
significant issue in either of the two 
cases, the communicant in Fitzgerald was 
a co-petitioner with his father in 
asserting the privilege.88 
Finally, the divergence of the opinions 
in these two cases illustrates a principal 
rationale for the rejection by the courts 
of invitations to create new testimonial 
privileges. Arguably, the decision in 
Fitzgerald resulted from a combination 
of inadequate analysis on the part of the 
A & M court89 and erroneous reliance 
on the arguments of trial counsel. 90 
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that 
the "state of the law" in New York is at 
best uncertain regarding the question of 
whether a de facto parent-child privilege 
exists in that State, and under what 
circumstances it applies. It is also 
arguable that Fitzgerald is, at best, 
dubious authority,9l particularly when 
considered in isolation. Thus, it appears 
that A & M must neccesarily be 
... [c ]onfidential communications 
between family members have not yet 
been afforded the status of testimonial 
privilege. "98 
The court considered this failure to 
recognize a familial privilege as 
anomalous in view of its conclusion that 
many of the existing privileges "have 
common elements [ w ]hich are 
socially desirable" and which are 
analogous to the parent-child 
relationship.99 By way of illustration the 
court compared the attorney-client, 
husband-wife and pschotherapist-client 
privileges, noting that these privileged 
relationships are "socially desirable" 
and that they require confidentiality 
among communicants. IOO 
Refering to the husband-wife 
privilege in particular, the court noted 
that despite arguments against its 
continued operation, "[its] continued 
vitality indicates a legislative and judicial 
determination that invading the privacy 
of the marital relationship is simply too 
high a price to pay for the possible 
benefits of compelled disclosure. "lOl 
The court expressed a similar view of the 
A limited child--parent testimonial 
privilege is highly desirable and is 
legally and morally supportable. 
confined to its factual setting while the 
question awaits further clarification by 
the New York courts. 
B. In reo Agosto: A Federal Court View 
The parent-child privilege has been 
recognized by the United States District 
Court for the District of Nevada.92 In a 
lengthy opinion the court declared that 
"a parent's liberties are inseparable from 
those of his children"93 and held that a 
child and his father were entitled to 
claim the privilege mutually and 
independently94 when the child's 
testimony was sought for presentation 
before a grand jury.9S The court also 
adhered to the position taken by the 
Fitzgerald court that age could not be a 
factor in determining whether to extend 
the privilege.96 
Preliminary to its discussion of the 
case on the merits the court surveyed the 
existing testimonial privileges and how 
they related to the parent-child 
privilege.97 The court observed that, 
despite the "[recent] expansion of 
[testimonial] privilege[ s] protecting 
communications between professionals 
and lay persons in a wide variety of fields 
parent-child privilege insofar as the 
privilege "is necessary to protect and 
preserve the family harmony and 
prevent dissention [within the family 
unit],,102 despite its concededly adverse 
effect on the truth-gathering function of 
the court. Thus, the court's support of 
this new family-based privilege rested, at 
least in part, on an apparent belief that 
the privilege was supportable on the 
basis on broad social policy, that society 
itself promotes certain relationships as 
inherently desirable and valued, and that 
the occasional loss of valuable evidence 
is an acceptable cost of this expression of 
society's will. 103 
The court related the broad social 
policy issues supra to protections 
afforded under the Constitution and 
concentrated on the need to protect and 
foster "'family autonomy"104 in the face 
of occasional competing State 
interests. !Os Like the A & M and 
Fitzgerald courts before it, the Agosto 
court also found support for the 
privilege in the Constitutional right of 
privacy,106 and noted the words of 
Justice Brandeis who declared that '''as 
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against the Government, the right to be 
let alone - [is] the most comprehensive 
of rights and the most valued by civilized 
men. "'107 The court thus concluded that 
recent Supreme Court treatment of 
privacy issues associated with the family 
setting (t demonstrate[ s] that the 
Supreme Court has determined that 
there is a 'private realm of family life 
which the State cannot enter."'108 
The court concluded that the parent-
child testimonial privilege satisfied the 
first three of Wigmore's conditions 109 
supra for recognition of a privilege, but 
that resolution of the fourth condition, 
"[ whether] [t ]he injury that would 
inure to the relation by the disclosure of 
the communication [would] be greater 
than the benefit thereby gained for the 
correct disposal of litigation," 110 
presented a more difficult problem. In 
the opinion of the court the difficulty 
arose 'because this component requires 
a balancing between the benefit to 
Ijustice ... as opposed to the injury to the 
parent-child relationship." III 
The court expressed the view that the 
forced disclosure of confidential 
communications between a parent and a 
child would lead to a "breakdown of the 
trust" between them. 112 The court 
believed this "breakdown" would cause 
"the child [to] view the entire legal 
system [with suspicion] ... [and that] 
[t]he parents themselves might lose 
respect for the legal system, if forced to 
testify against the child." 113 
According to the court, the legal 
system itself would suffer a detrimental 
effect if parents were compelled to 
testify against their children. 
Specifically, the court expressed the 
view that such compulsion would lead 
to perjured testimony by witnesses who 
would attempt to protect one 
another. 114 While the court 
acknowledged that the witness may, of 
course, elect to tell the truth, it opined 
that it was highly likely that 
circumstances would effectively leave 
witnesses only the choice between 
commlttmg perjury or subjecting 
themselves to possible contempt 
proceedings for refusing to testify at 
all. liS The court concluded that the 
expected benefit to society brought 
about by the recognition of the parent-
child testimonial privilege outweighed 
the benefit to justice because, inter alia, 
"the expected benefit to justice ... is 
perhaps illusory."116 
Finally, the court noted that it was 
"free to extend the present law of privileges 
to deal with those situations 
encountered in which constitutional 
protection is deemed essential." 117 The 
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court premised the foregoing view not 
on the Constitution per se, but on "[t]he 
expansive posture taken by 
Congress"118 in drafting Federal Rule of 
Evidence 501.119 The court observed 
that the history of Rule 501 clearly 
indicated that Congress intended for the 
courts to remain free to recognize new 
testimonial privileges. Because Congress 
had rejected an Advisory Committee 
proposal which narrowed some existing 
privileges while completely abrogating 
others, the court concluded that "Rule 
501 recognized and arguably even 
advocated the evolution of new testimonial 
privileges as they were deemed necessary 
by courts in the future." 120 
The Agosto court displayed a 
courageous attitude in its treatment of 
the issues with which it was confronted. 
In acknowledging the reluctance of 
other federal courts to adopt the 
privilege and the refusal of those courts 
to follow the lead of the New York 
courts, the Agosto court declared: 
"[t]his court will assume no such timid 
posture ... [n ]or will [it] ignore well-
reasoned legal arguments simply 
because they occurred within the 
framework of state court opinions."121 
Thus, the court followed the reasoning 
of the New York cases in general, and of 
the Fitzgerald court in particular, 
concluding that the confidential 
communications between parents and 
their children are entitled to privilege 
without restrictions as to the age122 of 
the communicant or distinctions based 
on the source of the communication. 123 
While its enthusiasm for addressing 
the question of the parent-child 
privilege may be commendable, the 
Agosto court exceeded the bounds of 
proper judicial review by deciding 
questions not in issue. It is a 
fundamental principle of judicial review 
that courts shall not reach constitutional 
questions unless presented squarely 
with justiciable issues. 124 Assuming as 
correct the court's observation that it 
was "free to extend the present law of 
privileges"12S pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Evidence 501, the court could have 
resolved the issue of privilege on the 
basis of non-constitutional 
authorities. 126 Nor need it have reached 
beyond the facts of the case to decide 
that age could not be a factor in defining 
the privilege. 
The court's analysis of the viability of 
the parent-child privilege when it is 
tested against the Wigmore conditions is 
generally sound. In that portion of its 
opinion dealing with the Wigmore 
analysis, the court relied almost 
exclusively on a law review article 
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written by Charles Coburn on the 
subject of the parent-child testimonial 
privilege. 127 However, no where in his 
article did Coburn suggest the 
desirability of extending the privilege to 
include the "right" of parents to use 
their children as a shield against the rule 
of law. 
In traversing well beyond the bounds 
of proper review, the Agosto court 
inadvertently undermined the strength 
of its own authority. In its well-
intentioned desire to be at the vanguard 
of "a new frontier in the area of 
testimonial privileges, "128 the court 
discarded the basic tenets of judicial 
restraint, and thereby sacrificed at least a 
degree of its power to persuade. 129 
C. Other Courts 
If any of the foregoing court decisions 
are to gain support it will most likely be 
the A & M decision because of its 
relative restraint. In this regard, the 
comment of the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts is telling. In declining 
to adopt the parent-child testimonial 
privilege, the court rejected Agosto but 
declared that it was the court's "extreme 
position - an absolute privilege not to 
testify at all - that [it]reject[ed]."130 
Other state and federal courts have 
declined to follow the lead urged by the 
A & M, Fitzgerald and Agosto courts. 
While several have implied a degree of 
sympathy regarding the concept of a 
parent-child privilege, 131 most have 
appeared to be either neutral or, in the 
case of the Indiana Court of Appeals, 
completely hostile to the proposal.132 
In United States v. jones, 133 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit rejected the privilege when it was 
claimed by the twenty-nine-year-old 
emancipated son of a grand jury 
"target." The court distinguished A & 
M on the grounds that jones involved an 
adult child who was emancipated, and 
that the information sought related to 
business activities, not intra-familial 
communications. 134 However, the court 
indicated that changed factual 
circumstances might yield a different 
result in the future.135 The court 
concluded with the reservation that "in 
particular, we do not endeavor to decide 
to what extent the age of the child and 
whether or not emancipation has occurred 
mayor may not affect the decision as to 
whether any familial privilege exists."136 
In In re Grand jury Proceedings,137 the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declined 
to adopt the privilege. There, a grand 
jury subpoena had been issued to the 
child of adults under investigation in 
connection with a homicide. The court 
distinguished the New York cases, 
noting that those involved confidential 
communications from the child to the 
parent and that they "were founded for 
the most part on the desire to avoid 
discouraging a child from confiding in 
his parents. "138 Finally, the court 
implied that even had the factual settings 
been analogous, the "persuasiveness" of 
the New York cases was questionable. 139 
The Ninth Circuit of Appeals,140 the 
Illinois Supreme Court141 and the 
California Court of Appeals l42 have 
declined to recognize the parent-child 
testimonial privilege, at least in part on 
the ground that the appropriate vehicle 
for extending recogmtlOn to new 
privileges devolves to the legislatures. 
Finally, in Hunter v. State143 the 
Indiana Court of Appeals flatly rejected 
the claim of two adults convicted of 
child abuse of their five-year-old 
adopted child. l44 Citing Cissna v. 
State,145 decided by the same court the 
previous year, the court declared: "[In 
Cissna] [t ]his court soundly denounced 
the theory of a 'parent-child' privilege ... 
and we feel correctly SO."146 Although it 
is arguable that the court's strong 
language was precipitated by the 
outrageous nature of the case before it, 
stronger language in rejecting the claim 
of a parent-child privilege will not be 
found. 
D. Summary 
Despite the results which obtained in 
A & M, Fitzgerald and Agosto, general 
acceptance by the courts of a parent-
child testimonial privilege seems 
unlikely. The reluctance of the courts to 
create new testimonial privileges is 
based on sound policy rationale 
including a longstanding policy of 
deferring to the legislative process. The 
diverse results of the three principal 
cases clearly illustrate the hazards 
inherent in judicial law-making of this 
type. Yet, despite the policy of restraint, 
the opinions cited in Section C supra 
indicate that a majority of the courts 
which have considered the question are 
generally sympathetic to the proposition 
of a limited privilege. _ 
IV. THE LIMITED CHILD-
PARENT TESTIMONIAL PRIVI-
LEGE 
The decisions cited supra which have 
recognized a parent-child privilegel47 in 
some form are clearly the exception and 
not the rule on the question of whether 
confidential communications betwen 
children and their parents may be 
withheld from the fact finding process at 
either the trial, grand jury, or the 
discovery levels of the judicial 
process. 148 It is also clear that, among the 
courts extending the "privilege," there 
has been an absence of a consensus as to 
whether it applies as a familial privilege 
149 generally, or whether its application 
should be limited to those 
communications from a child to his or 
her parents. 150 Finally, there is an 
absence of agreement on the question of 
whether the issues presented involve a 
privilege per se,151 or whether they rise 
to the level of a constitutional right of 
privacy. 152 
Despite these apparent inconsisten-
cies, a limited child-parent testimonial 
privilege is highly desirable and is legally 
and morally supportable. Because of the 
inconsistencies, a statutorily mandated 
privilege is necessary for the protection 
of society's most precious resource: its 
children. The model statute proposed 
infra153 would create a limited child-
parent privilege which would resolve the 
concerns of both the courts and 
commentators. 
A testimonial privilege vesting in the 
child l54 as to confidential communica-
tions made by the child to his or her 
parents155 in the reasonable belief that 
those communications will be 
confidential is an appropriate object of 
legislative attention. In establishing the 
privilege, it must be recognized that it 
derives from a recognition of a child's 
need to feel free to seek guidance, 
support and counsel from his or her 
parents without state-imposed restraint. 
It may be assumed that those times when 
such a need is felt most acutely by the 
child are precisely the times when 
children must feel unrestrained to 
follow their inclination to confide in 
those persons who generally are the 
most likely objects of their trust and 
affection. 
Conversely, while a parent may feel a 
similar desire l56 to confide in his or her 
child, the very fact of adulthood must be 
presumed to impress conscious restraint 
and discriminating judgment upon the 
parent. An adult, by virtue of age and 
more complete knowledge and 
experience, is presumed to have the 
ability to more completely assess the 
consequences of disclosing confidential 
information to a child. No such 
presumption may fairly be imposed on a 
child. It is not the function or the duty of 
society in general, nor of the judicial 
system in particular, to shield adults 
from their own indiscretions. While it is 
proper to question whether a child has 
knowingly and intelligently waived l57 a 
claim to confidentiality by disclosing 
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potentially incriminating facts to his or 
her parent(s), the same inquiry is 
inappropriate when a competent adult 
discloses similar information to his or 
her child. Put simply: the parent knows 
or ought to know better. The critical 
inquiry is not whether to create a 
privilege which encourages parents to 
confide in their children; it is whether to 
encourage, unfettered, the natural and 
desirable inclination of children to 
confide in their parents. In this regard, it 
is a proper function of society in general, 
and of the judicial system in particular, 
to refrain from interference with and the 
exploitation of the most basic and 
natural impulses of those in our society 
who are most vulnerable. Accordingly, 
the model statute proposed infra 
expressly rejects the broad bilateral 
privilege extended in both Fitzgerald and 
Agosto. 
One commentator has opined that 
"the existence of a parent~child privilege 
would have no significant impact on the 
desirable elements of the relationship. "158 
Such a bald assertion cannot reasonably 
stand on its own bottom; however, in 
light of the foregoing discussion, and 
despite the objections of the Fitzgerald 
court, age "barriers"159 are appropriate to 
the aplication of a child~parent 
testimonial privilege. A father need not 
be his adult, emancipated child's 
"confessor" in order to "full[ y] and 
satisfacto[rally]"160 maintain the parent~ 
child bond. Numerous confidential 
relationships are available 161 to the 
competent, adult and emancipated 
child. 162 The availability of these 
relationships provides the would~be 
confidential communicant with a myriad 
of alternatives to disclosure of potentially 
incriminating evidence to a parent. 
Because other alternatives are available 
to a competent, emancipated, adult child, 
confidentiality is not "essential" to the 
"maintenance of the relation[ ship ]"163 
between a parent and such a child. 
Accordingly, the statute proposed infra 
limits the application of the privilege to 
children who are not yet emancipated and 
who are under the age of twenty~two,164 
The sole exception to the proposed 
limitation would permit the privilege to 
extend to an adult child who is found by a 
court to be mentally retarded such that 
the mental and emotional age of the 
child would otherwise qualify the child 
to claim the privilege. 165 
Under the statute the applicability of 
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the privilege is presumed,l66 except in 
circumstances where the child 
communicatesl67 with his parents in the 
presence of third parties who are not also 
family, members.168 Although the 
presumption arises that the 
communication was not intended to be 
confidential in the later case,169 both 
presumptions are rebuttable by the party 
against whom the presumption arises. 
The latter presumption is rebuttable by a 
preponderance of the evidence tending to 
prove that ( 1) the child intended the 
communication to be confidential (as in 
the case of a conversation overheard by 
the third party), 170 or (2) under the 
circumstances, the child had a reasonable 
expectation that the communication was 
confidential notwithstanding the 
presence of the third party (as might 
occur if a child disclosed confidential 
information to a parent in the presence of 
a third party who is so familiar or well 
known to the child that the child would 
have no apprehension as to the extent of 
the third party's loyalty ).171 
The statute expressly forecloses its 
application in certain circumstances, 
including cases of child abuse, incest and 
abandonment.172 Since it is intended to 
be applied for the exclusive protection 
and benefit of children, the shield they are 
necessarily provided under the statute 
must be stripped away in those 
circumstances where the privilege would 
otherwise stand as a shield for the benefit 
of an offending parent. In these 
circumstances, the courts are well 
equipped to apply every available 
resource for the benefit of a child who is 
compelled to give testimony under these 
exceptions to the privilege. 
Provisions are also included which will 
prevent the child from asserting the 
privilege in those circumstances where a 
parent may seek the court's help in 
controlling the child's behavior.173 Such 
eventualities were foreseen by the A & M 
courtl74 which recognized that a privilege 
which purports to be for the benefit of 
children would fail in its essential 
purpose were it to do otherwise. 
Finally, the privilege would be 
unavailable to a child who seeks to invoke 
its operation (1) in proceeding "to 
establish the mental competency of [the] 
proceeding "in which the child and his 
parent are opposing parties;" 176( 3 ) where 
parent are opposing parties; "176 (3) where 
the child is "charged with a crime against 
his parent or other legal child of the 
parent; " 177 or, (4) when it is found that 
the otherwise confidential communica~ 
tion was made in "furtherance of a crime 
or fraud." 178 
The model statute proposed infra is 
designed to antlclpate those 
circumstances in which the privilege is 
likely to arise. The principal 
consideration in the operation of the 
privilege is the reasonable subjective 
perceptions of the child. Accordingly, 
those perceptions should be judged 
according to the perceptions which are 
reasonable for a child of the same age, 
intelligence and experience l79 acting 
under similar circumstances. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The enactment of a statutory child~ 
parent testimonial privilege would 
eliminate the confusion evident in 
present case law. Most importantly, a 
limited child~parent testimonial 
privilege would vigorously promote 
"[a] relation ... which in the opinion of 
the community ought to be sedulously 
fostered."180 
In view of the increased attention 
attracted by the issue of the child~parent 
privilege, particularly as demonstrated 
by recent case law, and considering the 
inadequate response of the courts to the 
questions presented, the author urges 
legislative enactment of a statute 
extending a limited child~parent 
testimonial privilege. The model statute 
proposed infra provides the framework 
for such legislation. m 
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Appendix 
Child-Parent Testimonial Privilege 
Model Statute 
r:P OOI Definitions. 
As used in this statute. the following words 
and phrases have the meanings ascribed. 
(a) "Child": a person who is undertheage 
of twenty-two (22) years and who is un-
emancipated. A person who is found by the 
court to be mentally retarded to the extent 
that the mental and emotional age of the 
person is that of a person under the age of 
twenty-two years shall be considered a 
"child" for the purposes of this statute 
whether or not emancipated and regardless 
of actual age. 
(b) "Communication": any expression, 
interchange or transmission of ideas, ex-
pression of thoughts or messages between 
two or more persons which is intended for 
the purpose of making known from one to 
the other the content of such ideas, expres-
sion of thoughts or messages. The medium 
bv which communications are imparted 
shall not be restricted. 
(c) "Confidential Communications": any 
communication made by a child to his pa-
rent and to which a presumption of confi-
dentiality attaches. Except as otherwise 
provided in this statute the presence of third 
persons shall not alter the confidential na-
ture of the communication. 
(d) "Parent": includes the natural or adop-
tive parent(s), step-parent(s), foster parent(s) 
or guardian(s) of the child. 
(e) "Proceeding": any juvenile delin-
quency hearing or proceeding, adult civil 
or criminal proceeding, or grand jury pro-
ceeding. 
(f) "Waiver": the intentional and volun-
tary relinquishment of a known right by 
the child or his guardian. 
(g) Where the masculine gender is used in 
this Statute, it shall be taken to include the 
feminine gender as appropriate. 
§1002 Child-Parent Testimonial Privilege. 
Any confidential communication shall be 
outside the scope of discovery in any judi-
cial proceeding when the communication 
is made-
(a) by the child to his parent, or by the pa-
rent to the child in response to or in com-
munication with confidential communi-
cations; 
(b) within the context of the family rela-
tionship; and 
(c) for the purpose of obtaining the sup-
port, advice or guidance of the parent. 
§I003 Person Who May Claim the Privilege. 
The child-parent privilege may be c1aimed-
(a) by a child on behalf of himself and his 
parent and as to confidential communica-
tions between the child and his parent; 
(b) by a guardian appointed by the court 
on behalf of any child as defined in this 
Statute; or 
(c) by an attorney on behalf of the child. 
§1004 Waiver of the Privilege. 
(a) A child may waive the privilege only 
when acting through the effective assis-
tance of legal counsel. 
(b) Exception: A person upon whom this 
Statute confers a privilege against disclo-
sure waives the privilege if he discloses any 
significant part of the privileged matter 
following his retaining competent legal 
counselor consents to disclosure by his at-
torney of any significant part of the privi-
leged matter. 
§1005 Presence of third persons: Effect on Privi-
lege. 
(a) The presence of third persons at the 
time of the confidential communication 
and who are not members of the child's 
immediate family raises a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the communication of the 
child was not intended to be confidential. 
(b) The presumption raised under § 1005 
(a) may be rebutted by a preponderance of 
the evidence that, under the circumstances 
in which the comrnunication occurred, the 
child had a reasonable expectation that the 
communication was or would remain con-
fidential, notwithstanding the presence of 
or inadvertent divulgence to the non-family 
member third person. 
§I006 Presumption of Confidentiality. 
Except as provided in § 1005, a presump-
tion of confidentiality shall attach to any 
communication claimed by the child to be 
confidential. The opponent of the privi-
lege shall have the burden of establishing 
that the communication was not confi-
dential by clear and convincing evidence. 
§I007 Exceptions. There shall be no privilege 
under this Statu te under the following cir-
cumstances -
(a) When invoked in furtherance of a 
crime or fraud: when sufficent evidence has 
been introduced in any proceeding which 
warrants a finding that the communication 
was made, in whole or in part, to further or 
facilitate the active involvement of any per-
son in a crime or fraud; 
(b) Proceeding to establish competency: in 
any proceeding brought by or on behalf of a 
party to establish the mental competency of 
a child or his parent; 
(c) Proceeding in which the child and his 
parent are opposing parties: no privilege 
shall be recognized in any civil or criminal 
proceeding in which the child and his pa-
rent are opposing parties. 
(d) The child and his parent shall be 
deemed to be opposing parties in any pro-
ceeding in which the parents are opposing 
parties or in which the parent is charged 
with: 
i. Child abuse; 
ii. Incest; 
iii. Adultery; 
iv. Child neglect; or 
v. Abandonment or non-support. 
(e) Charge of crime against the parent or 
legal child of the parent: any child charged 
with a crime against his parent or other 
legal child of the parent shall not be entitled 
to claim this privilege. 
(f) Parent Seeking Assistance of Court: 
no child may claim this privilege for the 
purpose of preventing his parent from tes-
tifying about matters in which the parent 
is seeking the assistance of the court in 
controlling the child's bahavior. 
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